Effects of Set-Size on Switch-Cost by Gustafsson, Camilla
SET-SIZE AND SWITCH-COST 1
Effects of Set-Size on Switch-Cost
A master's thesis (30 ECTS) submitted to the Department of Psychology,
the Faculty of Social Sciences, Lund University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Science in Psychology
Camilla Gustafsson
January 2016
Supervisor: Magnus Lindgren
SET-SIZE AND SWITCH-COST 2
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Drs. Lily Fitzgibbon, Lucy Cragg, and Daniel Carroll for letting me use 
their switching-task. I would especially like to thank Dr. Fitzgibbon for her kind help with any
questions and practical issues I had.
SET-SIZE AND SWITCH-COST 3
Abstract
This study investigated how a set-size manipulation (as published in Fitzgibbon, Cragg & 
Carroll, 2014) could affect switch-cost in a switching-task, and the relation to working 
memory capacity. A student sample of 29 participants was recruited. Results revealed that 
decreasing the set-size might facilitate switching. Working memory capacity was negatively 
correlated with repeating a task (i. e., with not switching), when the set-size was large. The 
results are relevant to theoretical top-down and bottom-up explanations of switch-cost, and 
have practical implication for the further use of task-switching paradigms.
Keywords: task-switching, set-shifting, set-size, switch-cost, flexibility, perseveration
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Effects of set-size on switch-cost
Adapting one's behaviour flexibly to changing environmental demands is crucial. 
The nervous system is adapted for this function, but still it can be difficult to overcome strong
habits. We tend to get stuck in behaviours and mental sets, even if we want to overcome them.
Having changed our password, we might still type in the old one. We might perseverate in old
ways to solve a problem, that is, to reach our goals. Both switching and perseveration are 
functional, but in various circumstances. Standing at the ATM, we efficiently type in the code 
we have used for years, and not much effort is required for this. But, having changed the code 
recently, automatically typing in the old one without further thought, is clearly not efficient. It 
might even be detrimental if we perseverate on typing in the old one, if the bank keeps the 
card. More cognitive work is needed when switching to a new code. We have to overcome the
strong memory of the old code and the motoric habit of typing in the old code, and we have to
actively keep the new code in our mind. Combatting this interference of the old code, might 
possibly depend on aspects such as for how long we have had the old code and how often we 
change our code. It might also depend on how many different cards we use. Probably, 
individual differences in cognitive capacity are related. In this study I intended to 
experimentally investigate how the size of a mental set affects switching.
The theoretical background will start with what we know about executive 
functioning, especially its sub-component of flexibility, and the related task-switching 
paradigm and its measure of switch-cost. It further explores cognitive processes that lead to 
flexibility and to inflexibility. It emphasises the importance of representation of the rule (e. g.,
a code or a password) and so-called complex rule-use, and it also notes the automatic learning
of associations, which can stand in the way for flexibility. Finally, it describes how set-size 
manipulation can explore all these issues. To my knowledge, there is not much research 
looking on set-size in task-switching.
Executive Functioning
The important cogntive functions that are needed to control and change our 
behaviour adaptively, like when standing at the ATM with the new code, are referred to as 
executive functions (or sometimes cognitive control). Faced with this new situation, it is not 
adaptive to rely on the automatic and well-learnt behaviour we have done so many times 
before. A new strategy is required. The executive functions are referred to as top-down 
processes, which means that our intentional effort is required. When standing at the ATM, this
environment automatically triggers the old code and the behaviour of typing in that one. 
These processes are referred to as bottom-up processes. They are our stimulus-driven 
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responses from the environment. For successful behaviour, such as getting the money, it is 
required that our top-down executive functioning overcomes the bottom-up interference from 
the strong association between standing at the ATM and the representation of the old code, an 
association that might have been built up for years.
These demanding situations involve three core executive functions, which are 
referred to as flexibility, inhibition, and working memory (Diamond, 2013; Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter & Wager, 2000). Inhibition is the ability to suppress 
one's attention to irrelevant and interfering information, or to stop prepotent responses. A 
prepotent response can be the automatic behaviour of typing in the old code. Without 
inhibition we would be at the mercy of conditioned responses and stimuli in the environment 
that steal our attention (Diamond, 2013).
Working memory is about actively maintaining and working with information 
(Miyake et al., 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). At the ATM, we must 
actively represent what is relevant in this particular situation, that is, the new code and not the 
old one. It is important to note that it is not short-term memory, which is simply to hold 
something in mind (Diamond, 2013). It also includes working with something other, while 
holding the information in mind (Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm & Engle, 
2005). It involves updating information and monitoring information.
Further, with working memory it is possible to relate information in order to derive a 
general principle (Diamond, 2013). It allows for seeing relations between what seems 
unrelated, and also to pull apart items from the integrated whole. An essence can get 
abstracted from something. Instead of seing red, blue, green, yellow, we might consider this as
colour. Our knowledge hence gets conceptual and not only perceptual (ibid.).
Flexibility is the ability to switch attention between several representations, or to 
switch between tasks, strategies, and responses (Miyake et al., 2000). It builds on the two 
other core executive functions, and it develops later (Diamond, 2013). It concerns ability to 
change perspectives or strategies. In order to change perspectives, it is necessary to inhibit the
previous perspective and load the new one into working memory. Flexibility is the opposite of
rigidity. One has to be able to switch successfully between the possible codes. The three core 
executive functions clearly are intertwined with each other, even though they are separable 
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Since the topic of this thesis is switching, I will continue 
describing flexibility. I will describe methods for measuring switching-ability and theoretical 
explanations for flexibility and inflexibility (or perseveration).
Flexibility
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Flexibility is required for example when a strategy does not work, and one has to try 
another strategy. To rigidly persevere with the old strategy is not adaptive. Sometimes one 
indeed intends to switch, but fail to do so, because the old habit is automatised.
The most used approach to study cognitive flexibility is the task-switching paradigm 
(Meiran, 2010; see also Grange & Houghton, 2015; Kiesel, Steinhauser, Wendt, Falkenstein, 
Jost, Philipp & Koch, 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2010; and Monsell, 
2003 for exhaustive reviews of the task-switching paradigm). In these tasks, participants have 
to switch their attention and their responses between different perceptual stimuli, and the 
measure of interest is the switch-cost. Switching typically is more effortful and takes longer 
time, than choosing to do the same thing as before (i. e., to stay on the task). It is also typical 
to make more errors. In other words, switching comes at a cost. Reasons for why switching 
costs more, might be the interference from the earlier task (like the old code mentioned 
above), and it might be trouble to load the new task into working memory.
In a switching task, the participant typically might get two cards to choose from. The 
two cards might be blue and red. The experiment-leader tells the participant to choose either 
blue or red, and after responding, the participant gets a new set of cards to choose from. The 
rule (i. e., whether blue or red is correct to choose) typically changes over this run of sets, and 
this is supposed to reflect switching. The rule can also be to choose blue every second time, 
for example, which therefore requires more working memory, because the participant is not 
cued explicitly from the experiment-leader concerning the right rule.
The cost of switching compared to repeating a task, is typically seen on two levels. It
is not only seen when comparing the response to each single card. It is also seen when 
comparing entire runs of these sets of items to choose from, and runs where there is no need 
to switch (i. e., when the participant can repeat taking the blue each time). Other stimuli than 
colours might be used in task-switching, like a number and a letter displayed together, where 
the participant is to choose between responding to the number or the letter. Another version is 
to get a sequence of numbers, where the task is to add 3 and subtract 3 from every, for 
example, second trial.
It is not only flexibility and working memory that are important in these task-
switching paradigms. Interference of the irrelevant task (such as the old code in the ATM-
example) and the inhibition of responding to this, is a crucial feature. There is a conflict. The 
former response to the blue card might stand in the way for responding to the red one, 
especially if blue have been the correct colour for several consecutive trials. The task of 
switching between red and blue is relatively simple, in typical experiments the conflict is 
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more complex, because of more dimensions than just one (colour, in this case). The target 
card might represent both a colour and a shape (i. e., two dimensions). Then there might be a 
blue rectangle, a red rectangle, a blue triangle, or a red triangle, on that card. The set-size is 
much larger.
The increased conflict and complexity is seen in how this kind of task-switching 
paradigm is structured. The target card comes up with two option cards to choose from. The 
two options always accord to the target card on one dimension, but not the other. For example,
if the target stimulus is a red rectangle, and the rule is shape, then the two options to choose 
between would be a blue rectangle and a red triangle. In this case, the correct response is the 
blue rectangle, because shape is the rule. Note that both options accords on one of the 
dimensions, and this is the interfering conflict. The only cue is the rule, so it is crucial to keep 
the rule in mind. The interference from the conflicting stimulus has to be suppressed, in order 
to perform the task successfully. This kind of task-switching paradigm therefore allows for 
complex manipulations to explore flexibility.
Increasing the dimensions and the options within each dimension, allows for 
manipulations of how the size of the mental set might affect switching. The example above 
had two dimensions (colour and shape) with two levels within each dimension (red and blue, 
and rectangle and triangle). This can be called a 2x2-design. The number of total individual 
exemplars consequently are four, that is, all the possible distinct combinations. So the number
of these categorical dimensions decides how many possible exemplars there are. Five colours 
and five shapes would render 25 different stimuli. This is the set-size (Fitzgibbon, Cragg & 
Carroll, 2014).
An early predecessor of this task-switching paradigm is the Wisconsin Card-Sorting 
Task (Berg, 1948; Grant & Berg, 1948; Milner, 1963). In this, each card typically can vary on 
three dimensions, and with four levels on each, so the set is 4x4x4. The dimensions are 
colour, shape, and number of items, so one card can have three yellow stars on it. Only one 
dimension is correct, and the conflict comes from the alternative dimensions that interfere. 
The only cue for which dimension to attend to, is the rule. A successful performance also 
requires suppression of the irrelevant rules. With a larger set-size, there obviously becomes 
more stimuli to attend to, and consequently more effort is needed to switch correctly, due to 
the interference.
As mentioned above, the switch-cost is the measure of how well the participant 
switches (Grange & Houghton, 2015; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). The cost of switching, 
compared to repeating the task, shows in slower responding and more errors. The switch-cost 
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is taken as evidence for that switching is more cognitively demanding than not switching. 
Further, the faster responding when not having to switch possibly reflects habitual learning 
through repeating a task (e. g., when having typed in the same code for years). In other words,
there are two possible theoretical explanations for the phenomenon of switch-cost; top-down 
control and bottom-up associative learning.
Switch-cost as an operationalisation of flexibility has generated much research. It has
been found that despite given ample time for preparation, and despite being cued, participants'
switch-cost does not diminish completely (Meiran, 1996). Children might even perseverate on
the old rule, despite explicitly and repeatedly being told which one is the correct rule (Zelazo, 
Müller, Frye & Marcovitch, 2003). The top-down and bottom-up theories trying to explain the
costs of switching, will be described below. One can divide the theories in two parts; the ones 
that explain how processes behind switching contribute to flexibility, and the ones that explain
how processes behind switching contribute to rigidity (Meiran, 2010). The latter ones are 
obstacles in form of habits, while the former ones ensure successful goal-achievement (by 
combatting the inner obstacles). In other words, it is about the automatic bottom-up processes 
and top-down control processes.
Automatic Processes Leading to Inflexibility
The habitual automatic processes driven by stimuli rather than the organism's own 
intentions, are mainly so-called task-set inertia, and associative learning (Meiran, 2010). The 
task-set is the mental representation of the whole task-situation; what the task is, that this 
problem has to be solved (ibid.). One has a goal to reach. It is critical that the task-set has to 
be updated when the task changes (Grange Houghton, 2015; Meiran, 2010). The task involves
making a response, preferably an appropriate one. At the ATM, the task is to get money out of 
the machine. One has a mental representation of this goal. If having changed the code 
recently, there are not only one code represented in one's mind. One has to monitor the task to 
perform it successfully. Or in the laboratory, one's task might be to sort the particular card on 
the dimension shape. Task-set change leads to slowed responding, that is, slowed behaviour. If
the mental representation of x changes, the response-time slows. Task-set inertia subsequently 
is when the representation of the task lingers on; the memory-traces stay. (Logan 2003; 
Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994). The activation of the mental representation carries on. The 
switching from one task to another involves two parts; inhibiting the old and now irrelevant 
task, and activating the new and relevant task (Meiran, 2010). Task-set inertia implies that the 
representation of the first task has not been properly inhibited and the new task not properly 
activated. The former rule of sorting cards according to colour, lingers on and interferes with 
SET-SIZE AND SWITCH-COST 9
the new rule of sorting to shape. This contributes to the switch-cost.
Apart from task-set inertia, associative learning is a major obstacle for switching. 
Stimulus-set binding (Meiran, 2010; Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003; Allport & Wylie, 
2000) refers to the binding between task-sets and the stimuli on which the task is executed. 
The idea is that the set gets (automatically) retrieved from memory when the participant re-
encounters the stimuli. Associative learning is useful because we learn to perform tasks more 
automatically; they become habitual and do not require the same amount of effort as new 
tasks. Sometimes however, the particular stimulus might require a new task, and the old 
stimulus is no longer relevant (Meiran, 2010). Standing at the ATM with a new card and new 
code, the memory trace of the old code possibly gets retrieved. This habitual response to 
heavy learnt stimuli-associations can be quite strong. In order to overcome these habitual 
responses, and the above mentioned inertia in task-set relevancy, intentional control-processes
are needed (ibid.). These control processes, to which I now turn, contribute to flexibility 
instead of inflexibility.
Control Processes Leading to Flexibility
Control in switching-situations requires intentionality, inhibition, and monitoring 
(working-memory). A control-process contributes to flexible goal-directed behaviour by 
helping to overcome the learnt habitual behaviour (Meiran, 2010).
There are three major control-processes in the task-switching literature; task-decision
and goal-maintenance, inhibition, and monitoring (ibid.). The subjects must know what the 
task is, and that knowledge may come from one's own memory as well as from an external 
cue. They also have to hold that representation of the task in working-memory. Secondly, they
must inhibit the first task in order to perform the new one. Thirdly, monitoring of changes is 
important.
After this description of processes facilitating and processes hindering switching, 
there will be a description of the importance of representation of the task, to combat 
interference and inflexibility. Active representation is important, and higher-level 
representation is also important.
Representation of the Task-Set
Representing the task is crucial. The subcomponents in any task for us, be it in an 
experiment or in real life, are initially to represent the task, then to plan how to execute it, 
followed by actual execution, and finally evaluation of the how well it worked (Zelazo et al., 
2003). Rigid representation of objects can lead to rigidity in problem-solving and hinder 
creativity (ibid.).
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Inflexibility is often studied with the concept of perseveration. Perseveration is 
regarded as “the repeated production of an action or thought” (Zelazo et al., 2003, p. 2). The 
concept of perseveration is common in developmental research and in clinical research, and 
has a negative sense to it. It is in these studies not used as meaning being perseverative to 
accomplish something, or persevere through something. In card-sorting paradigms, it is 
regarded as perseveration if the participant repeats to sort cards according to the old rule; the 
measure is called perseverative errors. Patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex tend to 
perseverate (Zelazo et al., 2003). Children perseverate on such tasks (ibid.), and their 
prefrontal regions indeed are not yet fully developed (Crone, Donohue, Honomichl, 
Wendelken & Bunge, 2006; Casey, Tottenham, Liston & Durston, 2005).
Inflexibility can occur at the level of representations and at the level of responses 
(Zelazo et al., 2003). Representations are about representation of task-sets and responses are 
about motor-programmes. The former one is about difficulty to inhibit an incorrect task-
representation and activating a correct one, and the latter one is about failure to inhibit an 
incorrect response despite having activated a correct task-intention.
An example of infant-perseveration is the A-not-B-error, where children tend to 
search for a toy at a previous location A, even when they have seen it being moved to location
B (ibid.; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999). It is interpreted as that they have difficulty representing
the object's location to override the prepotent response (i. e., the representation of the previous
location). During development, representational flexibility as well as the response-control 
increase. The increased representational flexibility (i. e., better ability to change perspectives) 
is suggested to reflect the development of a more complex hierarchical structure of rule-
systems.
Hierarchical Representation of Rules
Complexity-theory tries to explain executive function and its development (Zelazo et
al., 2003). The development of executive functioning is characterised as increased complexity
in terms of a hierarchical structure of rule-systems. When reflecting on the rules one 
represents, it is possible to represent them in relation to other rules, and to embed them in 
higher-order rules. A conditional statement is dependent on the satisfaction of another 
condition. A rule is embedded under another rule and controlled by it. Increases in embedding 
means more complexity of the complete rule system that has to be kept in mind (working-
memory) for a task. More complex rule-systems allow more flexibility when deciding 
between conflicting rules, as opposed to perseveration and stimulus-driven control.
The typical task-switching paradigm of sorting cards according to a rule, illustrates 
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the logic of complexity-theory. Two lower-level rules could be “if the card is blue, then put it 
here” and “if the card is red, then put it there”. The higher-order rule accordingly would be 
“sort the card according to colour”. This strategy allows for more successful card-sorting. If 
having sorted some red and blue cards, it would be impossible to sort a green card eventually, 
when the only options seem to be red/blue. Representing the stimuli as colour though, allows 
for accurate sorting when the green card shows up. This increasing complexity of hierarchical 
rule-systems also allow for successfully sorting conflicting stimuli, which is typical in these 
paradigms. If the target card is a red rectangle, and the two options two choose from are a 
blue rectangle and a red triangle, then it would be impossible to sort according to a lower-
level rule such as blue triangle. Having the representation of the higher-level rule though, (for 
example, shape), will tell you which of the two options are correct (in this case, the blue 
rectangle).
The development of rule-use can be mapped to sub-regions of the prefrontal cortex 
and their development (Bunge & Zelazo, 2006). Apart from increased flexible rule-use, 
memory and inhibition develop through childhood and adolescence for successful executive 
functioning. The three intertwined core executive functions are mainly related to prefrontal 
cortex (Smith & Jonides, 1999). Executive functioning and its related brain areas mature later 
than other areas, and decline earlier in life (Logan, 2003). Working memory might be 
especially important for flexible rule-use, as described in the task-switching paradigm. 
Working memory makes possible to see relations between items and to derive general 
principles from these (Diamond, 2013). Apart from this abstraction-ability, it also becomes 
possible to tease out details from an integrated whole (ibid.).
Maintaining Representations During Interference
The maintenance of representations in an active state is particularly important when 
there is interference (Kane & Engle, 2002). It is under interference-rich contexts that habitual 
responses and irrelevant information is more likely to be retrieved. There are individual 
differences in this working memory capacity. Reliable and valid measures for this general 
cognitive capacity are working memory span tasks, or complex span tasks.
Simple memory tests, so-called simple-span tasks, have a storage-component with 
the purpose of measuring the capacity of storage, for example remembering a list of numbers 
(i. e., short-term memory). Complex span tasks have an additional processing-component 
also, with the purpose to interfere with the storage-component (i. e., working memory). It 
might be about remembering a list of digits while doing mental arithmetic. This kind of task 
therefore is suitable to investigate how differently interference affects people, when they 
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perform a cognitively demanding task, such as switching. Individuals with lower working 
memory span scores are more susceptible to interference, than individuals with higher scores 
(ibid.). Individuals with high spans are more affected though by strong interference, that is, 
when the information has to be kept in a highly active state. It can be interpreted as that low 
spans do not engage that much attentional effort at all and consequently do not lose anything 
of it either. Individuals with low spans tend to rely more on automatic processing, instead of 
attentional control.
Abstract (hierarchical) task-representations help to guide behaviour when there is no 
particular cue elicited from the environment regarding an appropriate response (ibid.). The 
representations are actively maintained. If not, behaviour will be perseverative or 
inappropriate in general. The active maintenance of task-sets has the effect of inhibiting 
interference. In task-switching paradigms, the participant can be cued about the correct 
rule/dimension, or it has to keep the rule in mind, like when being told in the beginning to 
switch every third trial, for example. This cuing has become common in task-switching 
research (Meiran, 2015). The purpose is to control for the use of some general cognitive 
capacity. One is interested in measuring flexibility, and not how well the participant keeps the 
rule in mind. By cuing, one minimises the need for working memory, and can therefore more 
easily isolate how well the participant switches.
Individual differences in working memory capacity can reliably predict individual 
differences in executive tasks (Kane & Engle, 2002). It has been found that among healthy 
adolescents, working memory span tasks correlate with performance on switching in a typical 
card-sorting task (Lehto, 1996, Experiment 1). Perseveration showed marginal negative 
correlations, so failure to switch (i. e., perseveratively respond to the old rule) meant low 
working memory capacity, and success in switching meant high working memory capacity. It 
is important to note that in this study, the rule was not explicitly cued on every trial, so one 
might question whether this result concerns actual switching, or working memory.
Size of the Set
As mentioned earlier in this theoretical background, the task-switching paradigms 
may differ on number of dimensions and number of levels of each dimension. This reflects the
entire mental set or task-set. This has not been considered especially much in research. It is 
surprising, since this perceptual part is a major feature in these paradigms. The theoretical 
explanations for switch-cost might be informed by investigating set-size more.
The maintenance of the irrelevant mental set interferes with successful switching. An
association has been built up between the old stimulus and response. This association, this set,
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stands in the way when changing to a new behaviour. But such strongly learnt associations 
between stimuli and responses might make switch-cost disappear under certain circumstances 
(Kray & Eppinger, 2006; Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003; Allport & Wylie, 2000; Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995). It has been found that switch-cost decreased using a small set-size 
compared to when using a large set-size (Kray & Eppinger, 2006). This is simply because 
associations develop between stimuli and responses, so what seems as faster switching in fact 
is a practice-effect. It is therefore a risk in task-switching research, to not be aware of this. 
When seeing a decreased switch-cost (i. e., difference between switching and repeating), it 
might be about representing the particular associations between the exemplars, instead of 
switching between the higher-levels dimensions. Each single exemplar is displayed more 
often with a small set-size. The task-set is differently represented, in other words. It has been 
argued that a sufficently large enough set-size is needed to avoid associative learning to build 
up (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Then there will be less repetition of the stimulus and response 
associations, and consequently less possibility for strengthening of these.
In Kray and Eppinger's study (2006), a set of 4 exemplars in total, was compared to a
set of 96 exemplars in total. There were two dimensions to switch between, more specifically 
animals vs. non-animals, and one-syllable words vs. two-syllable words. They found age 
differences for the small set-size; old adults had slower response-times than young adults. 
Age-differences in switch-cost has been found in studies with small set-sizes (e. g., Mayr, 
2001; Meiran, Gotler & Perlman, 2001). It has not been found with larger set-sizes (e. g., 
Kray & Lindenberger, 2000). The bindings between stimuli and responses thus seem stronger 
in children as well as old adults (Hommel, Kray & Lindenberger, 2011).
Another study showed that this increased binding that arises from a small set-size 
increases the need for control (Kray, Karbach & Blaye, 2012). The bottom-up associative 
learning therefore dynamically interacts with top-down control processes. The interference 
was more seen in elementary school children compared to young adults. It can be explained 
by the finding that children are more stimulus-driven and that they are worse at representing 
and maintaining higher-order task-rules (Zelazo et al., 2003). In the study (Kray, Karbach & 
Blaye, 2012), the set consisted of two dimensions, and varying number of items of each 
dimension, more specifically two of each dimension, or 24 of each dimension. This rendered a
set-size of 4 and a set-size of 96, as in Kray and Eppinger's study (2006). The dimensions was
animal/thing and coloured/white.
A recent study investigated the relative roles of the bottom-up and top-down 
processes in task-switching (Fitzgibbon, Cragg & Carroll, 2014). The small set was 2x2, more
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specifically two colours and two shapes. The large set-size had nine colours and nine shapes; 
a total of 81 individual stimuli. The first experiment found that switch-cost was greater for the
small set-size than for the large set-size. The switch-cost correlated negatively with three 
childhood age-groups. The second experiment varied set-size in two blocks; blocks where the 
rule (shape or colour) repeated on every trial, and block where the rule switched. It was 
suggested that the top-down processes was initiated in the repetition-block, while the bottom-
up processes occurred in the switching-block. This way, they could compare the two 
theoretical explanations. The results supported the bottom-up account, and they failed to find 
support for the top-down account. It was found that a large set-size during switching led to 
smaller switch-cost, compared to a small set-size, suggesting that bottom-up associations 
might have been taken place during the small set-size. Increasing the set-size therefore led to 
better switching. If a large set-size during the non-switch block had led to smaller switch-
costs, this would have suggested that higher-level rule-representation had been taken place (i. 
e., representing the stimulus as colour rather than blue, red, etc.).
For children, the set-size typically is 2x2 (Zelazo et al., 2003). The purpose is to 
make the task as simple as possible (Kray & Eppinger, 2006). Even for adults, the task-set is 
relatively small; 4x4x4 in the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Task, which makes 64 exemplars. The 
three studies show that using a small set-size comes at a cost.
To my knowledge, there are not many studies investigating set-size in task-switching.
Further, a small set-size seems to decrease switch-cost, which is suggested to reflect the 
effects of associative learning and the subsequent need for cognitive control. But regarding 
the theories of increased abstraction in rule-representation, there should be support also for 
that a large set-size facilitates switching. I therefore aimed to study how set-size affects 
switch-cost, in a typical task-switching paradigm. I used the same task as Fitzgibbon et al. did 
(2014, Experiment 1), where the participant is cued on every trial to minimise other cognitive 
demands than flexibility. Executive functioning is fully developed first in adulthood. It 
declines early, so relatively young adults is the most suitable age group. Earlier studies have 
shown support for that bottom-up processes hinder switching. Engaging healthy adults that 
are better in executive functioning should show support for higher-level rule-representation, 
as in large set-size. Individual differences in working memory capacity should be related to 
such a finding.
My research question was: How does set-size affect switching? Based on earlier 
theory I had these hypotheses:
1. Set-size should affect switch-cost, as measured by response-times.
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1a. Large set-size should lead to less switch-cost, due to better abstraction of rules.
1b. Small set-size could lead to more switch-cost, due to stimulus-response bindings. 
However, this hypothesis is not clear, due to evidence that bindings engage more cognitive 
control.
2. Working memory capacity should be negatively correlated to response-times in switching.
2a. This relation should be mostly seen to small set-size, due to the larger interference.
In general, switch-blocks should be slower than non-switch blocks, and switch-trials 
should be slower than non-switch trials, in line with general theory about switch-cost.
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Method
I designed the study in order to manipulate set-size effects on switch-cost, and to 
explore the relation to working memory capacity. The purpose was to see if perceptual aspects
of the stimuli (in the form of set-size) might affect switching ability.
Participants
Participants' (N = 29) age was M = 30.41, SD = 7.35. Females were 17 and males 
were 12, or 58.6 percent vs. 41.4 percent. All except one were right-handed. None reported 
colour-blindness. Prior to their participation participants were informed about anonymity and 
possibility to withdraw at any time. They were recruited from university environments. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions, and conditions were counterbalanced 
across participants. There was no missing data. There were 15 participants in a large set-size 
condition and 14 in a small one. The study was approved by the department, for compliance 
with ethical standards.
Design
It was a mixed between-within experimental design. The switching-task consisted of 
three variables, set-size (between-participants), block (within-participants), and trial-type 
(within-participants). All had two levels. The factor Block was divided in pure blocks (always
the same rule) and mixed blocks (the rule switched unpredictably from trial-to-trial). The 
mixed blocks had non-switch trials and switch-trials. This allows for two measurements of 
switch-cost, more specifically switch-cost on trial-level, which is the difference within blocks,
and also block-level switch-cost, for pure blocks vs. mixed blocks. The dependent variable for
measuring switch-cost was response-time in milliseconds.
The set-size condition could be either small or large. The small one had two different
colours and two different shapes, which made 4 stimuli. The large set-size had 9 different 
colours and 9 different shapes, which made 81 stimuli.
Analysis
I computed two mixed-measures analyses of variance to answer the first hypothesis 
about set-size, and a correlation for the second hypothesis concerning the relation to working 
memory capacity. The analyses of variance were computed for response-time. One was for 
block-comparisons (pure blocks and mixed blocks) and the second was for comparing trials 
(switch-trials and non-switch trials). I report effect-sizes besides probability levels, in order to
get a fuller picture of the significance-testing. Means can be found in Table 1.
In order to explore how working memory capacity is related to switch-cost, I 
compared scores on working memory capacity to the switching-variables. In complex span 
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tasks, I collected partial scores for each individual. I compared the mean-scores on group-
level for pure vs. mixed blocks, and for non-switch vs. switch-trials. I did this for both of the 
set-size conditions. I computed correlation-coefficients, which can be found in Table 2.
Materials
The switching task was the Switching Inhibition and Flexibility Task; SwIFT 
(Fitzgibbon, Cragg & Carroll, 2014). It was used by permission of the authors. It was 
presented on a laptop computer in a quiet room at the Psychology Department, and 
participants responded with a mouse connected to a usb-port on the computer. A left response,
that is, when the correct stimulus was on the left part of the screen, was mapped onto the left 
button of the mouse, and a right response was mapped onto the right button. The stimuli 
varied on two dimensions; shape and colour. There were nine shapes and nine colours, which 
made a total of 81 different stimuli (see Fitzgibbon et al., 2014 for examples of stimuli). 
Response-time and accuracy for each participant were recorded by the computer. The SwIFT 
lasted approximately 10 minutes.
Three complex-span tasks were used. These were Rotation Span, Symmetry Span, 
and Operation Span, as in the study by Foster, Shipstead, Harrison, Hicks, Redick & Engle 
(2015). These include a storage-component with an interfering processing-component, 
accordingly with theory of working memory capacity. One block from each task was used, 
which accounts for more than 90 percent of the variance in the full model, which is three 
blocks from each task (ibid.). The tasks were counterbalanced between participants. Partial 
scores for each task were collected for each participant. Partial scoring is superior to absolute 
scoring, in individual-differences research (Redick, Broadway, Meier, Kuriakose, Unsworth, 
Kane & Engle, 2012; Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm & Engle, 2005). The tasks 
should be used together (Foster et al., 2015), so I added the three scores together, and used 
this total score in the analysis. The tasks in total lasted approximately 45 minutes, and each 
approximately 15 minutes.
Procedure
Due to minor changes from the original version of the SwIFT, I will offer a full 
description of my version, in contrast to the complex span tasks, which are freely available for
researchers. On each trial in the SwIFT, it appeared a fixation box in the top centre of the 
screen, and it appeared for 1000 milliseconds. Then the target-stimulus appeared in the box, 
and stayed for 500 milliseconds. During this time, an auditory cue said either ”shape” or 
”colour”. Then two different response-stimuli appeared on the bottom left and bottom right 
parts of the screen, while the target stimulus remained on the upper part. The task was to 
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choose which of the two response-stimuli was correct, according to what the auditory cue had 
said. Of the two response-stimuli, one matched the target-stimulus on the shape-dimension, 
and the other on the colour-dimension. Neither of the response-stimuli was ever 
corresponding to the target-stimulus on both dimensions. The interference therefore was the 
two competing stimuli, which corresponded to both options, but only one was correct 
according to the cue. After a response, the next trial came up. No feedback was given, neither 
when participants responded correctly or not correctly, further there was no feedback 
regarding response speed. However, there was a practice-block in the beginning of each pure 
block, consisting of 4 trials, in which auditory feedback was given in the form of a voice 
saying ”very good”, or a ”beep”.
There were 2 pure blocks and 4 mixed blocks. The pure blocks had the auditory cue 
saying either shape or colour on every trial in the particular block; one block always got the 
shape while the other always got the colour. The two pure blocks were counterbalanced 
between participants so that every second one got the shape-rule first and the colour-rule next,
and vice versa. Each pure block consisted of 9 trials, so 18 trials in total. The stimuli always 
appeared in the same order for every participant, that is, it was sequentially selected and not 
randomised in any way. In the large set-size, the stimuli were constrained so that each 
exemplar within a dimension occured only once as a target stimulus within a block. Further, 
an exemplar within a dimension never repeated on consecutive trials. There was at least one 
trial in between a reoccurring dimension. After the two pure blocks followed the mixed 
blocks, which consisted of 9 trials each. The target stimuli were constrained according to the 
same logic as the target stimuli in the pure blocks. In the small set size, each target stimulus 
appeared several times within a block. This is because there were nine trials and only two 
dimensions (compared to nine dimensions in the large set-size) and consequently there were 
repetition. This means more stronger priming and consolidation.
The trials in the mixed blocks were non-switch trials and switch-trials, depending on 
what rule the previous trial had had (stated by the auditory cue). Consequently, the first trial 
of each mixed block was neither switch nor non-switch. The trials of the pure blocks were 
neither switch nor non-switch trials, since the rule always was the same (either shape or 
colour). There were 17 switch-trials and 15 non-switch trials in total, in the task.
In the beginning of the task, the participant was shown an example array of a target 
stimulus and two response stimuli, and I explained the task and how they were to respond 
correctly. The stimuli in the instruction, as well as the stimuli in the 8 practice trials (4 in the 
beginning of each pure block) were not the same as in the trials that were to be recorded from.
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Before the pure colour block, a display showed the text ”The Colour Game” and before the 
pure shape block, it was shown ”The Shape Game”. Before the first mixed block, the display 
said ”The Colour and Shape Game”. Before the rest of the mixed blocks, a text was shown 
that reminded participants to respond fast but also correctly. Before the practice blocks, a text 
said that there would be 4 practice trials where nothing will be logged, and before the ”real” 
blocks a text said that it is for real and that response time and accuracy will be logged. There 
was no practice block before the start of the mixed blocks.
After having completed the SwIFT, the participants got the working memory 
capacity tasks. The tasks were Operation Span, Symmetry Span and Rotation Span and used 
with permission from Randall W. Engle's Attention and Working Memory Lab at Georgia 
Institute of Technology. These three complex span tasks were counterbalanced across 
participants. The three complex span tasks were the shortened versions used by Foster et al. 
(2015). The full model has three blocks of each of the span tasks, but it has been shown that 
using one block from each span task accounts for 91 percent of the variance in fluid 
intelligence, compared to the full model (ibid.). The purpose of using shortened tasks instead 
of traditional versions, is to prevent researchers from using only single tasks. It is important to
use multiple tasks to measure working memory capacity reliably (ibid.).
Each complex span task consists of three parts; a storage-component (i. e., simple 
span), a processing component, and a storage and processing component (i. e., complex span).
The purpose of the processing component is to prevent the rehearsing of the to-be-
remembered items, and therefore makes the task a complex span task and not only a 
storage/memory task. Each part starts with practice trials for the storage and the processing 
component respectively, and then several sets of trials for the storage and processing 
components combined (i. e., a complex span task). In the operation span, the distractor task is 
arithmetic operations, and these come between each item to be remembered, in this case 
letters. In the Symmetry Span, the distractor task is to judge whether an image is vertically 
symmetrical, and the storage task is to remember where in a grid a red box appears and in 
what order. In the Rotation Span, the distractor task is to judge whether a rotated letter is 
mirrorwise or normal, and the sequence to be remembered is in what order and direction two 
lengths of arrows are shown (see Foster et al., 2015, for figures).
The number of to-be-remembered items, as well as the distractor tasks, varied 
unpredictably from one trial to the next. The speed of the distractor displays was adapted to 
each individual's performance, because during the practice-phase of the distractor task, the 
response-time is averaged, and during the real trials participants have to respond within 2.5 
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standard deviations from their average response-time, otherwise the programme goes on to the
next set (of a storage component and a processing component).
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Results
I first show the results for the first hypothesis, which was about whether 
manipulation of set-size affects switching-performance. This was hypothesised to reflect 
theoretical issues of priming (which more likely builds up with a small set-size), and 
generalisation of higher-level rules (which should be easier with a large set-size). Then I show
the results for the second hypothesis, concerning relations to working memory capacity. 
Adults have developed their executive functioning and should be less susceptible to priming 
and its interference.
First I show the results from the two mixed analyses of variance where I had 
compared response-times between the groups. Here, I computed mean response-times. 
Possible switch-cost is seen when comparing the values in the table. These results and the 
accompanying Table 1 answers the first hypothesis.
After this first part, I show correlations between the different switching-variables (i. 
e., switch-cost between blocks and between trials) and working memory capacity. In the 
correlation matrix in Table 2, results for both set-sizes are shown. These results answers the 
second hypothesis. In the end, I conclude all results.
Set-Size Effects on Switching
I excluded the first trial from each block in the SwIFT prior to analysis, because 
these were neither switch trials nor non-switch trials. None of the trials had response-times 
less than 200 ms. Trials that were more than 2.5 standard deviations away from the 
individual's mean response-time for that type of trial were excluded (2.5 percent). The 
participants had accuracy-rates close to 100 percent, whereas the earlier study on children 
(Fitzgibbon, Cragg & Carroll, 2014) had lower rates. Therefore it would have been unsuitable 
to perform further analysis of this skewed distribution. The accuracy values ranged from 91 to
100 percent, and the typical was 98. In the response time analysis, incorrect trials were 
excluded and also the first trial after an inaccurate trial; such trials cannot be considered as 
definite switch or non-switch trials (Fitzgibbon et al., 2014). The total number of trials entered
into the analysis was 1302. Of these, 669 came from large set-size and 633 from small set-
size. 428 were from switch-trials and 377 from non-switch trials. 497 came from the pure 
blocks.
Trial-type (switch and non-switch) and block-type (mixed and pure) were within-
participants variables and set-size (small and large) was a between-participants variable. 
Means for response-time are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Response-times (in ms) by block-type and trial-type
Block-type
              Mixed                            Pure                      Switch-cost
Set-size    n              M   ( SD  )            95% CI                  M   ( SD  )            95 % CI                         
Small 14 519 (122) [438, 600] 436 (60) [373, 599] 83
Large      15            626 (168)         [548, 705]             562 (149)         [501, 623]             64       
Both        29            574 (155)         [515, 633]             501 (130)         [452, 551]             73       
Trial-type
              Switch                           Non-switch           Switch-cost
Set-size    n              M   ( SD  )            95% CI                  M   ( SD  )            95 % CI                         
Small 14 527 (122) [453, 601] 508 (139) [410, 605] 19
Large      15            618 (145)         [547, 690]             637 (206)         [544, 731]             -19      
Both        29            574 (140)         [521, 628]             575 (186)         [504, 645]             -1        
Note. CI = confidence interval.
First I looked on block-level. There was a statistically significant main-effect for set-
size, in the sample, F(1, 28) = 7.22, p = .01, partial eta squared = .21. Not surprisingly, there 
was also a statistically significant main-effect for block-type on response-times, Wilks' 
Lambda = .73, F(1, 28) = 9.9, p = .004, partial eta sqaured = .27.  This suggests that there are 
differences in response-times for mixed blocks and for pure blocks. Set-size affects response-
times, which is in line with the hypothesis. More narrowly, the group that got small set-size 
showed shorter response-times compared to the group that got large set-size, as seen in Table 
1. This is seen for both the mixed and the pure blocks. There was no statistically significant 
interaction-effect between set-size and block-type, Wilks' Lambda = .99, F(1, 28) = .15, p = .
7.
Secondly, I looked on trial-level. There was a marginally significant main-effect for 
set-size, F(1, 28) = 3.95, p = .057, partial eta squared = .13. However, and somewhat 
surprisingly, there was no statistically significant main-effect for trial-type, Wilks' Lambda = 
1.0, F(1, 28) = 0, p = .99. Hypothetically, there should be longer response-times for switch-
trials than for non-switch trials. When inspecting the table, it shows that the switch-cost is 
negative; -19 milliseconds. This would have suggested that switching is not at all a cost then, 
rather it would be the opposite. Concerning interaction-effects, it was as on block-level above;
no statistically significant effect on trial-level, Wilks' Lambda = .96, F(1, 28) = 1.14, p = .3.
The mean for large set-size overall was 602 milliseconds with a standard-deviation of
49, and for small set-size it was 488 with a standard-deviation of 88. The large set-size 
condition therefore led to more than a second of slowed switching, compared to the group that
got the small set-size condition.
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In sum, these findings suggest that there is a set-size effect on response-times, both 
when comparing pure and mixed blocks, and when comparing non-switch and switch-trials. 
More narrowly, a small set-size leads to faster responding, that is, better switching-
performance. However, it was not possible to see how set-size interacted neither with block-
type nor with trial-type. Also important, is that it was found that pure blocks were faster than 
mixed blocks, but it was not possible to see which trial-type was faster than the other.
Working Memory Capacity: Correlational Evidence
The second hypothesis in this study concerned relations of switching and set-size to 
working memory capacity. Higher working-memory capacity (WMC) should mean better 
cognitive control against interference from stimulus-task priming. It should also mean better 
ability to represent task-rules on higher-level dimensions. The results from the analyses of 
variance above showed faster responding during a small set-size. This is possible to interpret 
that priming has been taking place.
I explored how WMC is related to response-times between pure and mixed blocks, 
and between non-switch and switch-trials. Scores from various WMC-tasks should be 
aggregated (Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm & Engle, 2005). I therefore added 
the scores from all three tasks (i. e., Operation Span, Symmetry Span, and Rotation Span) for 
each individual. I used this new score in the subsequent analysis. This mean span-score for all
participants (N = 29) was 35.62, with a standard-deviation of 6.77, and the range was 26 – 52.
Means for the group that got large set-size was 35.33 (8.03), and the one that got small set-
size had 35.93 (5.4).
I computed correlations with response-time, and it was separately for each of the two
set-sizes. This rendered several correlations that were statistically significant. The correlation 
coefficients are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Correlation-coefficients between WMC and mean response-times (ms) for trial-type and 
block-type as a function of set-size                                                                 
                                        1              2              3              4              5                      
1. WMC – -.35 -.30 -.33 -.57*
2. Switch-trial .06 – .91** .97** .66**
3. Non-switch trial -.21 .72** – .98** .60*
4. Mixed block -.09 .92** .93** – .64**
5. Pure block                  .16           .43           .27           .38              –                      
Note. Correlations for large set-size (n = 15) are presented above the diagonal, and 
correlations for small set-size (n = 14) are presented below the diagonal.
* p < .05, two-tailed.
** p < .01, two-tailed.
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Of most interest are the ones that significantly correlate with WMC, that is, pure 
block for the large set-size group, with a coefficient of -.57, which is a strong correlation. This
negative correlation suggest that high WMC means shorter response-times, and low WMC 
means longer response-times. This is in line with the hypothesis, but it is important to note 
two things. This finding concerns pure blocks. In other words, it was in this sample not 
possible to find such a correlation for switching (i. e., mixed blocks or switch-trials). 
Secondly, the finding concerns the group that got the large set-size. That is, with a large set-
size there is a significant (negative) relation to WMC, but such a relation could not be found 
with a small set-size. In sum, high WMC is related to shorter response-times in pure blocks 
and with a large set-size, and low WMC is related to longer response-times under the same 
circumstances.
Regarding the other significant correlations, it shows that they are strong, except the 
ones for pure block in the large set-size. Concerning the hypothesis about a set-size effect, it 
is worth noting that the positive correlation between non-switch trial and switch-trial is .72 for
small set-size, but .91 for large set-size. This difference in strength is not seen for the other 
significant variables (except pure block then). In other words, the relation between response-
times for the two different trial-types is stronger with a large set-size than with a small set-
size.
In sum, a significant negative relation between WMC and response-times could be 
seen for pure blocks, and there is evidence also for the first hypothesis regarding a set-size 
effect.
Conclusion of Results
According to the first hypothesis, there was an expection to see differences in 
switching-performance, dependent on the set-size manipulation. There was evidence for a set-
size effect when comparing blocks as well as when comparing trials. More narrowly, a small 
set-size led to faster response-times, well above 100 milliseconds.
The second hypothesis expected a relation between switching, set-size and WMC. It 
was shown a significant negative correlation for pure blocks and large set-size. Regarding set-
size, there was evidence for stronger relations between non-switch trials and switch-trials for 
the large set-size group, compared to the small set-size.
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate how set-size affects switch-cost, and to 
explore the relation to working-memory capacity. Based on the theoretical background, I 
expected that a large set-size would facilitate switching and that a small set-size would hinder 
switching, as measured by response-times. But a small set-size could engage top-down 
control, so less switch-cost might be seen in the small set-size too. Further, I expected a 
negative correlation to working memory capacity, and this would be stronger for a small set-
size, in which there is more interference. These hypotheses were based on earlier theory, 
suggesting that this sample of healthy adults should be better able to cognitively control the 
interference from a small set-size. They should also be better able to represent the rule on a 
higher-level dimension.
Set-size did affect response-times, but not as expected. It was the small set-size that 
had shortest response-times, and not the large one, as expected. There was a negative relation 
between working memory capacity and repeating the task/rule (i. e., pure blocks as opposed to
mixed blocks), more specifically, it was for the large set-size.
Even though it was the small set-size that responded fastest, this result still 
enlightens the theoretical logic behind the hypothesis. Possibly the repetion of stimulus-
response bindings engaged more cognitive control, seen in the faster switching. Earlier theory 
has also found that small set-sizes lead to less switch-cost. This study therefore confirms what
have been found earlier. I did not find what Fitzgibbon et al. (2014) found; that increasing the 
set-size leads to less switch-cost. In that study, it was found that children were facilitiated in 
switching, by increasing the set-size and therefore weakening the associations between 
stimuli. My study on healthy adults shows rather that decreasing the set-size leads to less 
switch-cost. This is reasonable, because an adult sample with better cognitive control than 
children, would be less helped by increasing the set-size, since they already are quite well at 
combatting interference.
This result is further enlightened by considering the switching's relation to working 
memory capacity (WMC). First, the negative correlation was for the large set-size. Second, it 
was for pure blocks, that is, non-switching or repeating a task. Repeating a task therefore is 
negatively correlated to response-times, during a large set-size. This means that high WMC is 
related to low response-times in a block with no switching, while low WMC is related to 
longer response-times. People with low WMC seem to be negatively affected even on pure 
blocks, as seen on the longer response-times, compared to people with high WMC. This can 
be interpreted as if their need for control is so great that they need it even under low-demand 
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circumstances such as when not having to switch. One should not forget though that the other 
correlations did not turn out significant, so it might be due to power issues detecting 
significant correlations also for the other variables. In that case WMC had correlated also with
switching. WMC has typically been investigated on extreme groups (e. g., taking the 25 
percent worst and the 25 percent best), but this sample consisted of students, so the range in 
WMC is without doubt restricted. This study was explorative however concerning set-size and
WMC, so more sensitivity can be designed into further studies.
Concerning that this correlation was seen only for the large set-size, it could reflect 
the idea that a large set-size means less bindings, and consequently it is not as easy to rely on 
these automatic processes when responding. Even if the rule is shape on every trial, there still 
is a lot of stimuli to manage. Low WMC might then be more affected by lack of strong 
associations between the stimuli. High WMC though, manage to repeat a task fast without 
relying on such associations, so their response-times are still short, as seen in the negative 
correlation. Further, a large set-size means more need for higher-level rule representation. 
This is important for switching, but presumably also for repeating the task, because of all 
stimuli to manage.
In sum, there was partial support for my hypotheses. The effect-sizes for the 
significant results were good. The sample was 29 on two conditions, which could be 
considered as a relatively small sample, but adjusting the probability-level would not suffice 
to render the values statistically significant.
The task-switching paradigms are used to measure cognitive flexibility. Relatively 
small set-sizes are used, especially with children. My study confirms the earlier research that 
exists on this topic. Set-size can affect switching. My study more specifically shows that 
decreasing the set-size can lead to less switch-cost, and it might be explained with increased 
cognitive control due to more interference. The negative correlation to working memory 
capacity (however only for pure blocks) is in line with this reasoning. In further research in 
task-switching, it therefore is important to take notice of the set-size. Otherwise, flexibility 
can be masked by other cogntive processes.
One might consider the engagement of a student sample as a limitation. Students 
have a restricted range in age, socioeconomic status, intellectual ability, and so on. However, 
my purpose was not to generalise findings to, for example, certain clinical groups. I wanted a 
convenient sample in order to test my hypotheses about perseveration and switching. When 
knowing more later on, it is possible to build interventions that might help groups that 
typically perseverate on these tasks. Certain clinical groups suffer from deficits in executive 
SET-SIZE AND SWITCH-COST 27
functioning, which shows as rigid and perseverative behaviour in daily life. Exploring factors 
that affect perseveration, on a healthy student sample, in the laboratory with an acknowledged
paradigm, is a step on the way.
One might also question the number of participants. Indeed, the sample was too 
small in order to detect interaction effects. However, interesting main effects showed up. 
These inform about the nature of switching. Future studies can try to look for how the 
variables interact. It would also be interesting to explore the nature of other aspects of the 
task-switching paradigm. Such basic components that need to be explored are, for example, 
how the stimuli are realised (typically as shape and colour), and how the feedback is given.
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